5.3 Sequential trade: Glosten–Milgrom
Motivation
Why is there a spread at all, if dealers compete and processing costs are tiny? Because some traders are informed. A dealer who sells to anyone at the same price as she buys loses to informed traders systematically. The spread is the price uninformed traders pay to cover those losses. This is the core idea behind M01's warning that a resting limit order is a free option.
5.3.1Zero-profit quotes#
Setup
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Journal of Financial Economics 14(1); Hasbrouck 2007, Ch. 5).
- The asset's value is , with ; write .
- One trader arrives. With probability she is informed and knows : she buys if and sells if . With probability she is uninformed and buys or sells with probability each, independently of .
- A risk-neutral, competitive dealer posts an ask and a bid before the trader arrives. Competition drives the dealer's expected profit on each side to zero: , .
Proposition 5.2Glosten–Milgrom quotes
The zero-profit quotes are
At :
where . The spread is increasing in and in , zero when , and equal to when . The dealer's expected profit from uninformed traders exactly offsets the expected loss to informed traders.
Proof
and . By Bayes' rule,
,
and , which is the formula for . The bid follows in the same way from and . At the denominators equal 1, so and , giving (5.6).
Zero profit at : an informed buyer arrives when and gains ; an informed seller symmetrically gains . An uninformed trader pays, in expectation, on a buy or on a sell. The dealer's expected profit per arrival is .∎
5.3.2Learning from order flow#
Dynamics Repeat the game: after each trade the dealer updates by Bayes' rule and requotes. The sequence of transaction prices is a martingale with respect to public information (tower property), so trade-price changes are unpredictable, unlike in the Roll model, where bounce creates negative autocorrelation. As trades accumulate, converges to 0 or 1, the posterior concentrates on the true , and the spread shrinks to zero (by (5.5), as or ). Information gets into prices through order flow, and the spread is widest when the market knows least, which is one reason spreads are wide at the open and around news.
5.3.3Spreads around news#
Worked example
A ₹1,500 stock awaits a result that will move it to ₹1,510 or ₹1,490 with equal probability. If 20% of arriving orders are informed (), the competitive spread is : bid ₹1,498, ask ₹1,502. An uninformed buyer loses ₹2 per share in expectation; an informed buyer gains ₹8. If the fraction of informed traders doubles, the spread doubles.
Code Exercise m05_kyle (in the app: Exercises → m05_kyle) implements (5.5) and simulates 400,000 rounds to check that the dealer's mean P&L is statistically indistinguishable from zero at three pairs.
Practitioner notes
- Glosten–Milgrom explains why liquidity providers widen spreads before scheduled news, why spreads are wider in small caps (more private information relative to public), and why your fills as a limit-order trader are worst exactly when you most want them: you are filled when the informed are trading against you. This is adverse selection, and it is what "realised spread" in (5.1) nets out.
- The model has no inventory risk or order-processing cost; adding them widens the spread further (Hasbrouck 2007, Ch. 5–6; O'Hara 1995).