Markets: A Rigorous Course

5.3 Sequential trade: Glosten–Milgrom

Advanced about 15 min

Motivation

Why is there a spread at all, if dealers compete and processing costs are tiny? Because some traders are informed. A dealer who sells to anyone at the same price as she buys loses to informed traders systematically. The spread is the price uninformed traders pay to cover those losses. This is the core idea behind M01's warning that a resting limit order is a free option.

5.3.1Zero-profit quotes#

Setup

(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Journal of Financial Economics 14(1); Hasbrouck 2007, Ch. 5).

  • The asset's value is V∈{VL,VH}V \in \{V_L, V_H\}, with P(V=VH)=θP(V = V_H) = \theta; write ΔV=VH−VL\Delta V = V_H - V_L.
  • One trader arrives. With probability μ\mu she is informed and knows VV: she buys if V=VHV = V_H and sells if V=VLV = V_L. With probability 1−μ1 - \mu she is uninformed and buys or sells with probability 12\tfrac12 each, independently of VV.
  • A risk-neutral, competitive dealer posts an ask aa and a bid bb before the trader arrives. Competition drives the dealer's expected profit on each side to zero: a=E[V∣buy]a = E[V \mid \text{buy}], b=E[V∣sell]b = E[V \mid \text{sell}].

Proposition 5.2Glosten–Milgrom quotes

The zero-profit quotes are

a=VL+ΔV θ(1+μ)θ(1+μ)+(1−θ)(1−μ),b=VL+ΔV θ(1−μ)θ(1−μ)+(1−θ)(1+μ).(5.5)\begin{aligned} a &= V_L + \Delta V\,\frac{\theta(1+\mu)}{\theta(1+\mu) + (1-\theta)(1-\mu)}, \\ b &= V_L + \Delta V\,\frac{\theta(1-\mu)}{\theta(1-\mu) + (1-\theta)(1+\mu)}. \end{aligned} \tag{5.5}

At θ=12\theta = \tfrac12:

a=Vˉ+μ2ΔV,b=Vˉ−μ2ΔV,a−b=μ ΔV,(5.6)a = \bar V + \tfrac{\mu}{2}\Delta V, \qquad b = \bar V - \tfrac{\mu}{2}\Delta V, \qquad a - b = \mu\,\Delta V, \tag{5.6}

where Vˉ=(VL+VH)/2\bar V = (V_L + V_H)/2. The spread is increasing in μ\mu and in ΔV\Delta V, zero when μ=0\mu = 0, and equal to ΔV\Delta V when μ=1\mu = 1. The dealer's expected profit from uninformed traders exactly offsets the expected loss to informed traders.

Proof

P(buy∣VH)=μ+(1−μ)/2=(1+μ)/2P(\text{buy} \mid V_H) = \mu + (1-\mu)/2 = (1+\mu)/2 and P(buy∣VL)=(1−μ)/2P(\text{buy} \mid V_L) = (1-\mu)/2. By Bayes' rule,

P(VH∣buy)=θ(1+μ)/2θ(1+μ)/2+(1−θ)(1−μ)/2P(V_H \mid \text{buy}) = \dfrac{\theta(1+\mu)/2}{\theta(1+\mu)/2 + (1-\theta)(1-\mu)/2},

and E[V∣buy]=VL+ΔV⋅P(VH∣buy)E[V \mid \text{buy}] = V_L + \Delta V \cdot P(V_H \mid \text{buy}), which is the formula for aa. The bid follows in the same way from P(sell∣VH)=(1−μ)/2P(\text{sell} \mid V_H) = (1-\mu)/2 and P(sell∣VL)=(1+μ)/2P(\text{sell} \mid V_L) = (1+\mu)/2. At θ=12\theta = \tfrac12 the denominators equal 1, so P(VH∣buy)=(1+μ)/2P(V_H \mid \text{buy}) = (1+\mu)/2 and P(VH∣sell)=(1−μ)/2P(V_H \mid \text{sell}) = (1-\mu)/2, giving (5.6).

Zero profit at θ=12\theta = \tfrac12: an informed buyer arrives when V=VHV = V_H and gains VH−a=ΔV(1−μ)/2V_H - a = \Delta V(1-\mu)/2; an informed seller symmetrically gains b−VL=ΔV(1−μ)/2b - V_L = \Delta V(1-\mu)/2. An uninformed trader pays, in expectation, a−Vˉ=μΔV/2a - \bar V = \mu\Delta V/2 on a buy or Vˉ−b=μΔV/2\bar V - b = \mu\Delta V/2 on a sell. The dealer's expected profit per arrival is (1−μ)⋅μΔV2−μ⋅(1−μ)ΔV2=0(1-\mu)\cdot\frac{\mu\Delta V}{2} - \mu\cdot\frac{(1-\mu)\Delta V}{2} = 0.∎

5.3.2Learning from order flow#

Dynamics Repeat the game: after each trade the dealer updates θ\theta by Bayes' rule and requotes. The sequence of transaction prices pk=E[V∣trades 1..k]p_k = E[V \mid \text{trades } 1..k] is a martingale with respect to public information (tower property), so trade-price changes are unpredictable, unlike in the Roll model, where bounce creates negative autocorrelation. As trades accumulate, θ\theta converges to 0 or 1, the posterior concentrates on the true VV, and the spread shrinks to zero (by (5.5), a−b→0a - b \to 0 as θ→0\theta \to 0 or 11). Information gets into prices through order flow, and the spread is widest when the market knows least, which is one reason spreads are wide at the open and around news.

5.3.3Spreads around news#

Worked example

A ₹1,500 stock awaits a result that will move it to ₹1,510 or ₹1,490 with equal probability. If 20% of arriving orders are informed (μ=0.2\mu = 0.2), the competitive spread is 0.2×₹20=₹40.2 \times \text{₹}20 = \text{₹}4: bid ₹1,498, ask ₹1,502. An uninformed buyer loses ₹2 per share in expectation; an informed buyer gains ₹8. If the fraction of informed traders doubles, the spread doubles.

Code Exercise m05_kyle (in the app: Exercises → m05_kyle) implements (5.5) and simulates 400,000 rounds to check that the dealer's mean P&L is statistically indistinguishable from zero at three (θ,μ)(\theta, \mu) pairs.

Practitioner notes

  • Glosten–Milgrom explains why liquidity providers widen spreads before scheduled news, why spreads are wider in small caps (more private information relative to public), and why your fills as a limit-order trader are worst exactly when you most want them: you are filled when the informed are trading against you. This is adverse selection, and it is what "realised spread" in (5.1) nets out.
  • The model has no inventory risk or order-processing cost; adding them widens the spread further (Hasbrouck 2007, Ch. 5–6; O'Hara 1995).

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