Markets: A Rigorous Course

6B.6 SIPs and rupee-cost averaging

Core about 20 min

Motivation

The SIP is how most new Indian investors buy funds: more than ten crore SIP accounts contributed in September 2026 (6B.5.4). It is often sold with the claim that averaging lowers your cost. The claim is true in a narrow sense and false in the sense that matters. Both halves can be proved.

Average cost as a harmonic mean#

The mechanism A SIP is a standing instruction: on a fixed date each month the bank account is debited by a fixed amount PP, and units are allotted at that day's applicable NAV (6B.2). Units bought in month ii are P/piP/p_i. M00 (0.2) gives the future value at a constant return.

Proposition 6B.6.1average cost is the harmonic mean

If PP is invested at each of the prices p1,…,pn>0p_1, \dots, p_n > 0, the average cost per unit is the harmonic mean of the prices, and it does not exceed their arithmetic mean:

cˉ=nP∑iP/pi=n∑i1/pi=H(p)  ≤  1n∑ipi=A(p),(6B.14)\bar c = \frac{nP}{\sum_{i}P/p_i} = \frac{n}{\sum_i 1/p_i} = H(p) \;\le\; \frac1n\sum_i p_i = A(p), \tag{6B.14}

with equality if and only if all prices are equal. For prices pi=A(1+δi)p_i = A(1 + \delta_i) with small dispersion, ∑iδi=0\sum_i \delta_i = 0 and σδ2=1n∑iδi2\sigma_\delta^2 = \frac1n\sum_i\delta_i^2,

H(p)≈A(p) (1−σδ2).(6B.15)H(p) \approx A(p)\,\big(1 - \sigma_\delta^2\big). \tag{6B.15}
Proof

The first equalities are definitions: nPnP rupees bought ∑iP/pi\sum_i P/p_i units. By the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, (∑ipi⋅1/pi)2≤∑ipi∑i1/pi\big(\sum_i \sqrt{p_i}\cdot 1/\sqrt{p_i}\big)^2 \le \sum_i p_i \sum_i 1/p_i, that is n2≤nA∑i1/pin^2 \le nA \sum_i 1/p_i, which rearranges to H≤AH \le A; equality holds iff pi\sqrt{p_i} is proportional to 1/pi1/\sqrt{p_i}, that is iff all pip_i are equal. For (6B.15), 1/(1+δ)=1−δ+δ2+O(δ3)1/(1 + \delta) = 1 - \delta + \delta^2 + O(\delta^3), so 1n∑i1/pi=1A(1+σδ2+… )\frac1n\sum_i 1/p_i = \frac1A(1 + \sigma_\delta^2 + \dots) and H=A/(1+σδ2+… )=A(1−σδ2)+…H = A/(1 + \sigma_\delta^2 + \dots) = A(1 - \sigma_\delta^2) + \dots∎

Worked example 6B.8

₹10,000 a month at NAVs of 100, 80, 125 and 100 buys 100+125+80+100=405100 + 125 + 80 + 100 = 405 units for ₹40,000: an average cost of ₹98.77, below the average NAV of ₹101.25. More units are bought when the price is low.

Averaging versus a lump sum#

What the proposition does not say H≤AH \le A compares a SIP with a strategy that buys the same number of units each month. It does not compare a SIP with investing the money at once, which is the decision an investor with a lump sum actually faces.

Proposition 6B.6.2averaging is not an edge over a lump sum

An investor has WW at time 0. The risky fund has expected gross return 1+μ1 + \mu per period, cash earns 1+rf1 + r_f, and μ>rf\mu > r_f. Strategy L invests WW at once. Strategy S keeps the money in cash and invests W/nW/n at times 0,1,…,n−10, 1, \dots, n-1. With returns independent across periods, expected wealth at time nn is

E[WL]−E[WS]=Wn∑j=0n−1[(1+μ)n−(1+rf)j(1+μ)n−j]>0.(6B.16)\mathbb E[W_L] - \mathbb E[W_S] = \frac{W}{n}\sum_{j=0}^{n-1}\Big[(1+\mu)^{n} - (1 + r_f)^{j}(1+\mu)^{n-j}\Big] > 0. \tag{6B.16}
Proof

Under L, E[WL]=W(1+μ)n\mathbb E[W_L] = W(1+\mu)^n because the expectation of a product of independent returns is the product of expectations. Under S, the tranche invested at time jj sat in cash for jj periods and in the fund for n−jn - j, so its expected value is (W/n)(1+rf)j(1+μ)n−j(W/n)(1+r_f)^j(1+\mu)^{n-j}. Each bracket is non-negative because (1+rf)j≤(1+μ)j(1+r_f)^j \le (1+\mu)^j, and it is strictly positive for j≥1j \ge 1.∎

S has lower variance than L, but only because it holds less equity on average: for most of the averaging period much of the money is in cash. Constantinides (1979) made the stronger point. A rule that fixes the purchase schedule in advance ignores information that arrives along the way (the realised prices and wealth). For any such schedule there is a policy that conditions on the current state and does at least as well for any risk-averse investor, so dollar-cost averaging as a decision rule for a lump sum is dominated. Sequential averaging buys a lower risk exposure, not a lower cost.

Worked example 6B.9

W=₹12W = \text{₹}12 lakh, μ=1%\mu = 1\% a month, rf=0.5%r_f = 0.5\% a month, n=12n = 12. Lump sum: E[WL]=₹13,52,190\mathbb E[W_L] = \text{₹}13{,}52{,}190. Averaging over the year: ₹13,15,974. The expected cost of averaging is ₹36,216, the price of holding cash for an average of 5.5 months.

The behavioural case for SIPs#

What SIPs really buy Most salaried investors do not have a lump sum: they have a monthly surplus. For them a SIP is not an alternative to a lump sum; it is investing each rupee when it is earned, which is what Proposition 6B.6.2 recommends. The real benefits are behavioural and operational: automation removes the monthly decision (and with it the temptation to time the market), and the instruction keeps running through a bear market, when stopping is most expensive. Measure a SIP's result with XIRR, M00 (0.3), never with "absolute return".

Practitioner notes

  • Received a bonus, an ESOP sale or an inheritance? The default from Proposition 6B.6.2 is to invest it according to your target allocation now. If you spread it over a few months to manage regret, call the cost what it is: a temporary underweight in equity.
  • SIP dates do not matter in expectation. Spreading one SIP over four weekly dates changes nothing but the paperwork.
  • A step-up SIP (raising the amount each year) is an income-matching device, not a return enhancer.

Create a free account

Reading is open to everyone. An account keeps your progress, answers, notes and code drafts, and gives you the study plan, the journals and the simulator. Running code needs an account approved for it.